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Evaluating Federally Appointed Judges 
in Canada: Analyzing the Controversy
TROY RIDDELL, LORI HAUSEGGER & MATTHEW HENNIGAR * 
This commentary describes our experiences in trying to undertake a judicial performance 
evaluation of federally appointed judges in Canada. Some respondents were enthusiastic 
about the project, but others were strongly opposed to it and worried about the effects 
that our survey would have on judicial independence. After describing the feedback that 
we received and the fallout from our project, we examine the relationship between judicial 
performance evaluation and judicial independence. We argue that a well-conceived judicial 
performance evaluation does not violate judicial independence. We then explore the resis-
tance to judicial performance evaluation in Canada, using a comparative lens. The explanation 
for this opposition, it seems, lies partly in the broader socio-political context found in common 
law jurisdictions with parliamentary systems of government and no judicial elections. In 
our view, opposition to outside academic inquiry from strong elements within the Canadian 
legal community also forms part of the answer.
Ce commentaire décrit la manière dont nous avons tenté d’entreprendre une évaluation du 
rendement des juges nommés par le gouvernement fédéral Canadien. Certains répondants 
se sont montrés enthousiastes quant à ce projet, alors que d’autres y s’y sont fortement 
opposés en se disant soucieux des effets que notre sondage pourrait avoir sur l’indépendance 
des juges. Après avoir décrit les commentaires que nous avons reçus ainsi que les réper-
cussions de notre sondage, nous nous penchons sur la relation qui pourrait exister entre 
l’évaluation du rendement des juges et leur indépendance. Nous faisons valoir qu’une évaluation 
bien conçue du rendement des juges ne porte pas atteinte à leur indépendance. Nous 
examinions ensuite la résistance à l’évaluation du rendement des juges au Canada à l’aide 
d’un prisme comparatif. L’explication de cette réticence réside en partie, semble t il, dans 
le contexte sociopolitique général des régimes parlementaires soumis à la common law où 
les juges ne sont pas élus. Nous sommes d’avis que l’opposition à une enquête universitaire 
externe de la part d’éléments vigoureux de la collectivité juridique canadienne fait également 
partie de la réponse.
* Troy Riddell, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Guelph. 
Lori Hausegger, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Boise State University. 
Matthew Hennigar, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Brock University. 
Th e authors gratefully acknowledge funding support from the Social Sciences and 
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“STUDY ASKING LAWYERS to critique judges sparks fi restorm.”1 When we undertook 
our research on judicial evaluation, this headline in Canada’s largest national 
newspaper, the Globe and Mail, was not the response we had anticipated. We 
had asked lawyers to evaluate, anonymously, the professionalism of federally 
appointed judges for the purposes of measuring aggregate patterns in relation 
to appointments made after the introduction of federal screening committees 
in 1988. Th e strong reaction of a number of legal bodies and individuals and 
the ensuing media coverage seriously undermined our ability to conduct the 
research. But perhaps more importantly, our experiences have raised substantive 
questions about the relationship between judicial evaluation, independence and 
accountability, and the politics surrounding the judiciary. Th is commentary 
explores two such questions: First, does undertaking judicial evaluations pose a 
threat to judicial independence or to the administration of justice; and second, 
why, when judicial evaluations are becoming more common in many parts of the 
world, are they so strongly resisted in Canada?
As described in Part I, our initial attempt at implementing the evaluation 
stage of our project took a subset of judicial appointments made from 1989–1997 
and asked lawyers to evaluate judges before whom they had appeared on a series 
of factors ranging from knowledge of the substantive law to the judge’s treatment 
of the parties before the court. Our next attempt was designed to capture a wider 
population. We asked law societies in each province to alert their members to our 
study and to provide a link to an online survey. With both rounds of evaluation, 
our goal was to get a snapshot of the quality of federal appointees to provincial 
superior courts and to the Federal Court of Canada. We also wanted to test 
whether appointees who had political connections prior to their appointments 
1. Kirk Makin, “Study asking lawyers to critique judges sparks fi restorm”, Th e Globe and Mail 
(4 March 2009) A8.
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were rated as highly as those without political connections. Previous research on 
judicial appointments made by the federal government before 1988 suggested 
that, on the aggregate, legal insiders tended to accord a lower legal reputation to 
judges who had a signifi cant political affi  liation with the party in power.2 More 
recent research suggests that the new screening committees introduced in 1988 
for federal judicial appointments have reduced the number of appointees with 
major political connections, though only modestly.3 Th e question of what this 
has meant for judicial quality has yet to be successfully addressed.
Part I describes our attempt to address this question and the issues our 
research raised. Th e project provoked strong responses, both favourable and 
unfavourable. Some members of the legal community expressed a concern 
about judicial evaluation and its eff ect on judicial independence. Others were 
very supportive of the idea and discounted any impact on judicial independence. 
To better understand these responses, we follow this fi rst section with an analysis, 
in Part II, of the relationship between judicial evaluation, judicial independence, 
and the accountability of the judiciary. After arguing that a properly conducted 
evaluation of the judiciary would not undermine judicial independence or the 
administration of justice (and would perhaps even enhance the latter), the 
commentary then explores, in Part III, why judicial evaluation is becoming more 
common in many places while in others, particularly Canada, there is resistance 
to the idea. Th e answer, in our view, lies partly in the broader socio-political 
context found in common law jurisdictions with parliamentary systems of 
government and no judicial elections. For example, in the United Kingdom, 
though evaluation processes are common for lower court judicial offi  cers, there 
has been a reluctance to introduce them for the senior levels of the judiciary.4 
Th ere is nothing inherent in the parliamentary system that would preclude an 
evaluation process that carefully accounts for issues of independence. However, 
judicial elections in US states and the civil service model of the judiciary in the 
civil law systems of continental Europe may encourage evaluation processes more 
so than parliamentary systems, given that these two methods of judicial selection 
2. Peter Russell & Jacob Ziegel, “Federal Judicial Appointments: An Appraisal of the First 
Mulroney Government’s Appointments and the New Judicial Advisory Committees” 
(1991) 41:1 UTLJ 4. See also Lori Hausegger et al, “Exploring the Links between Party and 
Appointment: Canadian Federal Judicial Appointments from 1989–2003” (2010) 43:3 Can 
J Pol Sci 633 at 633.
3. Ibid at 634.
4. Stephen Colbran, “A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Performance Evaluation Programmes” 
(2006) 4:1 J Commonwealth L & Legal Educ 35 at 58.
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more closely mirror the selection of other governmental actors, who receive feedback 
on their job performance. 
We believe that another part of the explanation is the opposition to judicial 
evaluation by strong segments of the Canadian legal community. Th is opposition has 
been infl uential enough to shut down attempts at evaluation, and it has not been 
countered by other powerful forces such as the executive or legislative branches 
of government, the media, or the public. Th e opposition to judicial evaluation 
may be part of a broader resistance to academic inquiry into the legal and judicial 
systems, driven perhaps by legal professionals’ self-interest or their overly-infl ated 
view of themselves as “guardians” of the legal system and community. After 
exploring these possible explanations, we conclude with suggestions for future 
lines of investigation into these issues.
I. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROJECT
A. BACKGROUND
In their study of federal judicial appointments from 1984–1988, Peter Russell 
and Jacob Ziegel found that 24.1 per cent of appointees had “major” involvement 
with the governing Progressive Conservative Party (as a party offi  cial, active 
participant in an election or leadership campaign, or candidate for elected 
offi  ce) and that 23.2 per cent had “minor” involvement (minor constituency 
work, fi nancial contributions, or close personal or professional associations with 
party leaders).5 Interestingly, informants in each province tended to rate those 
appointees with major political connections lower on average than those without 
major connections.6 
In response to criticism about the infl uence of patronage in the judicial 
appointment process, the federal government introduced screening committees 
in 1988 to vet judicial candidates.7 In their study of judicial appointments from 
1989–2003, Lori Hausegger et al found that the screening committees had some 
5. Russell & Ziegel, supra note 2 at 22.
6. Ibid at 23-24.
7. Th ese committees consist of members of the legal community; a member from the 
judiciary; a representative of the province; lay people; and, since 2006, a representative of 
the police. When the committee system was originally established, candidates were rated 
as being either “qualifi ed” or “not qualifi ed.” In 1991, these categories were changed to 
“highly recommended,” “recommended,” and “unable to recommend.” Additionally, at 
that time, committees were also asked to attach a précis about the candidate. In 2006, the 
Harper Conservative government revised the ranking system back to a two-tiered system 
(“recommend” or “unable to recommend”).
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eff ect in decreasing the number of major political activists appointed by the federal 
government. Th e study showed that 17.2 per cent of appointees had major political 
connections and 23.6 per cent had minor political connections to the party in 
power.8
Like Russell and Ziegel, Hausegger et al examined the quality of appointees 
chosen for the bench in terms of the extent of their political affi  liations. Respondents 
were asked to rate the appointees before they became judges. Th e results, presented 
in Table 1, below, show a trend similar to that found by Russell and Ziegel. 
Respondents rated appointees with major past political activities, social 
or professional connections as “outstanding” only 8.3 per cent of the time—
the lowest level of any category. Additionally, many more of these appointees 
were rated as “poor” or “fair” relative to other categories of appointees. Th e “no 
politics” category, a classifi cation not captured in Russell and Ziegel’s study, is 
perhaps the most instructive. While 32.1 per cent of these appointees were rated as 
outstanding (more than twice as many as any other category), none of them was 
rated as “poor” or even “fair.”9
Although these results are interesting, both studies are limited by the fact 
that they do not capture the performance of the appointee as a judge, but only 
the perceived quality of the appointment. Additionally, both studies are based on 
a limited number of observations from informants who assisted the researchers 
in determining political connections and who may or may not have personally 
interacted with the appointees. A more comprehensive evaluation of federally 
8. Hausegger et al, supra note 2 at 643.
9. Th ey also divided the data to examine the quality of appointees by their appointing prime 
minister. Th e diff erences between former prime ministers Mulroney and Chrétien were not 
signifi cant.
TABLE 1: QUALITY OF APPOINTMENT BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION 1989–2003












and Minor Direct 
Activities
Outstanding 32.1% 15.8% 8.3% 13.3% 10.0%
Very Good 33.3% 22.6% 31.8% 24.4% 30.0%
Good 14.1% 12.4% 28.1% 28.9% 30.0%
Fair 0% 1.7% 12.0% 6.7% 10.0%
Poor 0% 0.6% 4.2% 2.2% 0%
SOURCE: From Hausegger et al 2010, reproduced with permission.
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appointed judges would have two primary benefi ts: First, it would allow for 
an analysis of the relationship between political affi  liation and quality of judicial 
performance, rather than perceived quality of appointment (and could be 
based on the assessment of a number of individuals who had appeared before the 
judge); second, it would begin to provide an overall picture of the performance 
of federally appointed judges who had been selected under the new appointment 
system (using a sample size consistent with available time and resources). As discussed 
in greater detail in Part II, we believe that such an exercise would benefi t the 
administration of justice in Canada. 
B. ROUND ONE AND UNEXPECTED RESPONSES We constructed questions using existing judicial performance evaluation (JPE) 
surveys, particularly those conducted in US states such as Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, and Virginia, and a pilot project from Nova Scotia. 
In addition to the standard questions about legal knowledge, communication 
skills, fairness, and so on (categorized under the heading of “Evaluation”), we 
included a separate section of the survey, labeled “Decision-making.” Th is category 
contained questions about judicial decision-making tendencies such as whether 
the judge tended to favour the Crown prosecutor or the accused in criminal 
cases, “everything else being equal.”10 Although we intended the questions in 
this section of the survey to be used for future research on judicial decision 
making at the trial court level (a vastly understudied area, particularly in Canada) 
rather than to address whether the judge was “biased,” some respondents may 
have interpreted the questions as an assessment of whether judges were making 
substantively “right” or “wrong” decisions. We sent the survey to lawyers who had 
appeared before the judges in our sample.11
Neither judicial organizations nor law societies were asked to participate in 
the fi rst round of the study, nor were they forewarned that it would be conducted. 
Although the imprimatur of these organizations and their resources (particularly 
10. See the Appendix for the survey instrument.
11. Th e judges in our sample were appointed between 1989 and 1997. We chose this time frame 
to allow for comparisons between appointments made by the Conservative government of 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1988–1992) and the appointments made by the Liberal 
government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (1993–1997). We were going to compare our 
results to a study of federal judicial appointments from 1984–1988, just before the new 
federal appointment system was introduced; see Russell & Ziegel, supra note 2. Out of 532 
federal appointees in this time frame, we found enough potential evaluators for 369 of them. 
We found these potential evaluators by having research assistants comb through published 
decisions in law reports.
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lists of contacts) could have made the research easier, we feared that partnering 
with these groups might interfere with the independence of our inquiry. We did, 
however, ask several people including lawyers, judges, and staff  of one provincial 
law society to give us feedback on the survey. None of them expressed reservations 
about the research idea, so we were completely unprepared for the responses 
we received. 
Once the survey went out to potential evaluators, we began receiving feedback 
almost immediately. Some respondents contacted us directly and others took 
time to answer the general question about judicial evaluation that we placed at 
the end of the survey instrument. While some respondents were enthusiastic 
about the prospect of JPEs, particularly if they were to be used for judicial education 
purposes that might result in changes on the bench, other responses were less 
favourable. Some respondents expressed reservations about possible bias amongst 
the evaluators, arguing that the survey provided an outlet for lawyers with “an 
axe to grind.” One respondent argued that the evaluations would not necessarily 
provide a true refl ection of the quality of a judge since lawyers “like judges who 
decide in their favour and are collegial with lawyers.” Th is may have been what 
another evaluator was thinking when he suggested that the evaluation process “is 
no better than having students evaluate professors.” 
Some respondents also expressed concern about what we would do with 
the data. While we had recognized the sensitivity of the information we were asking 
lawyers to provide and strove to assure them of the confi dential and secure treatment 
that their replies would receive, we were obviously not explicit enough about 
our plans for the data. Th erefore, we modifi ed the information provided to 
respondents. We had originally told respondents that we planned to examine the 
aggregate results, that we would not share the results with any organization, and 
that our fi ndings were intended for academic outlets. We changed this disclosure 
to state more explicitly that this was an independent academic project, that we 
would not share the results with any organization, and that we would not publish 
individual judges’ results.12 
Some respondents had questions about the funding source we listed—the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)—and how closely 
connected it was to the government of the day. One respondent felt very strongly 
about this point, stating in an email to us, 
12. Some respondents had expressed hope that we would release the individual results. One 
respondent wrote, for example, “I hope you are doing it on every judge of the Court 
appointed between 1989 and 2008 and that you publish the data with the applicable data 
attached to which judge it relates to.”
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I assume that you are aware that SSHRC is an appendage of the Government of 
Canada which can control the ideological bent of those deciding who ought to 
receive grants. And many people know how to pick a researcher who will entirely 
independently give you the result you want … . It is my view … that this survey 
is an unwarranted and potentially damaging incursion into a fully independent 
judiciary bought and paid for by the government of the day… .
After an email exchange, this respondent was largely satisfi ed with our explanation 
that SSHRC was an independent government agency and that we would not be 
releasing individual judges’ results to the government or any other organization. 
However, this individual’s initial reply (and some other replies) alerted us to the 
possibility that the political environment might be infl uencing reactions to our 
project. Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper had criticized the judiciary 
in the past, promising to appoint more “law and order” judges.13 Th is comment 
angered many legal professionals and opposition politicians. Against this backdrop, 
the fact that we were using federal research funds and were conducting an evaluation 
of judges, which included questions on decision making in criminal cases, made 
some respondents suspicious.
Even after we reassured respondents that we were conducting an independent 
academic study and would not publish individual judges’ results, respondents 
continued to express concern about the act of evaluating judges itself. One 
respondent asserted that lawyers should never publicly comment on judges and 
expressed real concern that “negative comments about judges (even through an 
anonymous survey) might well have a negative impact on the view of the public 
towards our judicial system.” Another respondent, referring to our project, stated 
that “it’s inappropriate—stop doing it—judges cannot respond and surveys like 
this aff ect judicial independence.” Some respondents inquired whether we had 
received permission from the Canadian Judicial Council or the Offi  ce of the 
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Aff airs. Judicial independence was the most 
common worry among those who opposed the project. Although the specifi c 
threat to judicial independence was rarely stated, some respondents suggested 
that the survey results could be used to put pressure on judges to decide cases in 
a particular way or could cause them to attempt to be popular, rather than make 
necessary but unpopular decisions.
Still, it is worth noting that we had many enthusiastic responses to the evaluation 
process. One respondent merely wrote “it’s about time.” Others challenged the 
concern about judicial independence, arguing that “the judiciary is the last Canadian 
13. Clark Campbell, “PM says he’ll pick judges who are tough on crime”, Th e Globe and Mail 
(15 February 2007) A1.
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institution that is devoid of eff ective accountability. Too often, reasonable steps 
to address this are met with cries of the importance of judicial independence.” 
One respondent suggested that, while he supported judicial independence and 
“respected the diffi  cult and often lonely job of being a judge … there is a dif-
ference between the independence of the bench and judges being immune from 
constructive criticism.” 
Although we recognized the sensitivity of the information we were seeking, 
we were unprepared for the depth of feeling we stirred up. Beyond the emails from 
potential evaluators, we also faced questions from outside parties who had heard 
of the study. A chief judge in one province contacted us with concerns about 
what we were doing. We were contacted by various law societies that had received 
inquiries from their members about the propriety of participating. Th e Canadian 
Forum on Civil Justice asked us for information after it received inquiries about 
the project from lawyers and judges. The Office of the Commissioner for 
Federal Judicial Aff airs requested a copy of the survey instrument. Meanwhile, an 
assistant deputy attorney general in Ontario reportedly “directed” Crown counsel 
not to participate in the study.14 Shortly thereafter the justice reporter for the 
Globe and Mail wrote a story about the study that further aroused the suspicions 
noted above.15 Th e article referred to our project as a “federally funded” study 
and prominently featured the questions on judicial decision making.16 After the 
article was published, the Public Prosecution Service of Canada told its counsel 
that it was not appropriate for them to participate17 and our funding source, 
SSHRC, called to check in on our project. Th e SSHRC phone call spurred the 
Research Ethics Board at one of our universities to re-examine our “use of human 
subjects” application, which it had already approved, in order to ensure that we 
were operating in accordance with the approval. In light of these events and the 
likelihood of a skewed sample, we decided to shut down the survey and not to 
14. Near the end of February 2009, we received a number of replies from Ontario Crowns 
indicating that they had been told by their superiors not to participate. One respondent 
specifi cally mentioned that “[t]he direction came from Mr. John Ayre, Assistant Deputy 
Attorney General. He indicated that it is not the role of a Crown attorney to comment on 
the judiciary.” Th is email was communicated on 27 February 2009.
15. Th e day after the story appeared in the Globe and Mail, the paper published a letter to the 
editor about our project from law professor Jacob Ziegel, who is a prominent commentator 
on judicial selection. Ziegel expressed support for the project so long as the names of 
individual judges were not published—the headline for the letter was “Naming names a no-
no.” Globe and Mail (5 March 2009) A18. 
16. Makin, supra note 1.
17. We received emails from prosecutors in the Public Prosecution Service indicating that they 
had been told not to participate in the project.
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contact the hundreds of lawyers who had indicated they had experiences with 
judges that they were willing to share. We suspected that only a vocal minority 
had serious reservations with the project, but seeing that some individuals were 
concerned about participating and others were forbidden to do so, we decided 
that we needed to contemplate other approaches to get a more signifi cant 
response rate. 
C. THE COLLECTION OF EVALUATIONS: ROUND TWO
Our limited response rate in Round One, coupled with the skewed sample that 
resulted when Ontario Crown counsel and other lawyers were told not to 
participate in our study, made it necessary to redo our eff orts at evaluation. We 
began the second round with an attempt to address the concerns expressed during 
Round One. First, we deleted the separate section of the survey on judicial 
decision making to avoid any inference that we wanted to track how individual 
judges decided cases. Second, in order to reassure judges that we were conducting 
an academic study, not launching an attack on the judiciary, we sent a letter to 
the Canadian Judicial Council and the Commissioner for Federal Judicial 
Aff airs informing them of our project and providing them with assurances as to 
our goals. In the letter, we made it clear that we were conducting independent 
academic research, unaffi  liated with any group or party. We also emphasized that 
we would be reporting aggregate data, not releasing any individual judges’ results 
(although we indicated that we would be willing to let judges see their own overall 
average results for professional development purposes). 
Finally, we took a diff erent approach to recruiting evaluators. In an attempt 
to be more inclusive, we sent letters to law societies in eight of the provinces 
(leaving Quebec and New Brunswick for a later time when we could conduct 
the survey in French). Th ese letters sought to convince the law societies of the 
importance of our research and to reassure them as to our goals and methodology. 
Additionally, we asked the law societies if they would send an email to their 
members alerting them to the study and including a link to our survey—or 
at least making the link available on their website so that interested members 
could participate. 
We chose to recruit respondents through the law societies in the second 
round with the goal of reaching a far greater number of lawyers and increasing 
the response rate for our survey, which would, of course, help make our results 
more robust. By allowing lawyers to self-select into the survey we also expected 
to avoid one of the other hurdles that cropped up occasionally during the fi rst 
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round—respondents indicating that they did not have a good enough recollection 
of the judge to provide a meaningful evaluation.18
Furthermore, we hoped that the law societies’ support would calm some of 
the fears about the study. We recognized that seeking law society support might 
have the disadvantage of appearing to tie us to these organizations, inviting questions 
of what use the law societies might make of the data. In Round One, some 
respondents raised this issue in the general question near the end of the survey 
that asked whether law societies should be used to distribute the survey more 
broadly. Th ese respondents worried that the law societies would thereby gain 
access to the data and that they “would not preserve the confi dential nature of 
the survey.” With this in mind, we carefully drafted an introduction to the survey 
that reassured participants that we were independent academic researchers and 
that we would not share the data with any organization. 
Another concern we had with this second approach was that some lawyers 
distrust their law societies. One of our earlier respondents suggested that law 
societies have “too many biases and other motivations and agendas.” Another 
argued that “law societies have been instruments of secrecy and blatant support 
for the judiciary, no matter the abuses and incompetence. Th ey are classic 
examples of powerful monopolies that themselves, are not accountable to anyone, 
least of all their members.” Th us, while involving law societies may confer some 
legitimacy on the project in the eyes of some respondents (particularly those who 
contacted their law society upon receiving our fi rst survey to check the propriety 
of answering it), we were aware that such involvement might also expose us to 
other concerns and alienate some potential respondents. 
D. RESPONSE
In the end, only two provincial law societies agreed to alert their members to 
the study. When the law societies of other provinces did not respond after a 
follow-up email, we then emailed the provincial affi  liates of the Canadian Bar 
Association (CBA). Most of these organizations did not respond to our requests 
and, of those that did, none replied positively.
Although we did not receive much feedback from the provincial legal 
organizations—and no response from either the Federal Commissioner for 
Judicial Aff airs or the Canadian Judicial Council—we did get a blistering letter 
18. Of course, a diffi  culty with this approach is that there is no way to ensure that lawyers 
evaluating a particular judge have actually appeared before that judge. However, we do ask 
how many times they have appeared before the judge (in various forums such as trials or pre-
trial conferences).
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from the CBA itself. In that letter, the organization expressed concern that our 
research risked “undermining public confi dence in the Canadian judiciary and 
the Rule of Law itself.” Th ere was some confusion that we were attempting to 
correlate the ratings of judges with which party they supported, thus threatening 
judges’ freedom to support the political party of their choice.19 Th e CBA was also 
concerned that we would be unable to get unbiased evaluators because fi fty per 
cent of those appearing before the judges—counsel for the losing parties—would 
be “less than complimentary” to the judge involved in their case. Finally, the associa-
tion expressed concern about the impact the release of our “dubious fi ndings” 
would have on the public’s respect for the judiciary. As one might expect from 
these reactions, our second attempt at evaluation yielded very few responses.
II. THE ISSUES RAISED BY ATTEMPTS TO EVALUATE 
JUDGES
Eff orts at judicial performance evaluation have met with questions about the 
research methodologies used, the fairness of the process, and whether the practice 
violates judicial independence or provides an appropriate balance between 
independence and accountability.20 Our experiences certainly demonstrated 
people’s concerns about all of these issues and, in fact, highlighted another 
contentious question: Does research into JPE undermine or improve the admin-
istration of justice or the rule of law? 
In terms of research methods, the possibility of bias was raised by various 
respondents and is a concern in relation to JPE studies more generally. We believe 
that not all respondents will be infl uenced by their win/loss record, just as not all 
students evaluate their professors according to the grade they received. Nevertheless, 
steps must be taken to mitigate the possibility of biases distorting the results. 
19. Th e CBA may have learned that, as part of our research, we wanted to assess whether a 
judge’s degree of partisan affi  liation prior to appointment (such as donating to a party or 
running for offi  ce) was inversely correlated with their quality. However, even if this was the 
case, the CBA misconstrued the intent and the eff ects of our research.
20. Th eodore C Koebel, “Th e Problem of Bias in Judicial Evaluation Surveys” (1983) 67:5 
Judicature 224; Kevin M Esterling & Kathleen M Sampson, Judicial Retention Evaluation 
Programs in Four States: A Report with Recommendations (Chicago: American Judicature 
Society, 1998); Rebecca Wood & Sylvia R Lazos, “Refl ections in Response to the Nevada 
Judicial Evaluation Pilot Project” (University of Nevada Research Paper 10–36, 2009), 
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1650764>; Jean E Dubofsky, “Judicial Performance 
Review: A Balance Between Judicial Independence and Public Accountability” (2007) 34:1 
Fordham Urb LJ 315.
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Th ese steps include making the survey accessible to diff erent types of lawyers and 
achieving as large a sample size as possible for each judge, given time and resource 
constraints. Th ere are also methods to reduce the impact of outlying responses, 
such as eliminating the highest and lowest scores for a judge and using median, 
rather than average, scores.
Questions about how we would disseminate our results straddled concerns 
about our research methods and concerns for judicial independence and the 
administration of justice. As indicated above, there were fears that if we published 
individual judges’ results, the judges would not have the opportunity to respond, 
they might feel pressure to decide cases in a certain way, and the administration 
of justice might be compromised by negative judicial reviews. Conversely, some 
encouraged us to publish individual results. Still others hoped that the results 
would be given to a judge’s administrative superior to improve the quality of the 
justice system but would not be disseminated publicly. 
We did not believe that publishing the individual results would violate 
judicial independence because security of tenure, fi nancial security, and admin-
istrative independence would still buttress a judge’s ability to make impartial 
decisions. Indeed, in surveys of state judges in the United States, only a minority 
of respondents believed that the JPE process—complete with the publication 
of individual results—undermines judicial independence.21 As we began the 
process, therefore, we debated the possibility of publishing individual judges’ 
results.22 We decided against it because we were concerned that it might not be 
fair to publish results for some but not all federally appointed judges.23 Furthermore, 
publishing individual results was not necessary to address our two research goals: 
(1) assessing whether the inverse relationship found by Russell and Ziegel and 
Hausegger et al between the “legal reputation” of appointees and their partisan 
affi  liation with the party in power still held true while using a more rigorous 
methodological approach;24 and (2) analyzing the quality of appointments made 
21. David C Brody, “Th e Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations to Enhance Accountability, 
Judicial Independence, and Public Trust” (2008) 86 Denv UL Rev 115 at 143; Kevin M 
Esterling & Kathleen M Sampson, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs in Four States: A 
Report with Recommendations: Executive Summary (Chicago: American Judicature Society, 
1998) at 5.
22. We had no intention, though, of giving the results directly to administrative judges as some 
respondents had hoped. However, we were willing to share a judge’s overall result with him 
or her upon request, for professional development purposes.
23. Recall that to make the study manageable, we were only evaluating judges appointed between 
1989 and 1997. Additionally, for a number of these judges, we could not fi nd enough 
potential evaluators to keep them in the sample. 
24. Also, though we were using a more rigorous methodology than the one used by Russell 
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under the new appointment system, which was promoted as a way to improve 
the selection process and reduce the infl uence of patronage through the use of 
screening committees. As the unexpected controversy intensifi ed, we changed the 
survey’s introduction to make it much more explicit that we would not publish 
individual judges’ results, nor would we give them to any organization.25 
Having this more explicit wording in the second round of surveys, in addition 
to dropping the section on decision making, likely helped reduce the degree of 
opposition that we faced. Also, inviting lawyers to participate through their 
respective law societies in the second round, rather than simply sending out emails to 
individual lawyers, increased the chances that respondents would be favourably 
inclined toward the evaluation process. Nevertheless, uptake by lawyers was not 
as strong as we would have liked. And, in addition to the refusals of most offi  cial 
organizations to assist us with our survey, we still faced opposition to the project, 
as exemplifi ed by the CBA’s letter to us. 
Th e varied reactions to the project, from vociferous opposition to enthusiastic 
support, led us to undertake a systematic examination of the relationship between 
JPE, judicial independence, and accountability. Th is analysis is presented in the 
next section of the commentary.
A. INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE
In its 1985 Valente decision, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined three re-
quirements of judicial independence that would allow judges to decide cases 
impartially: job security, fi nancial security, and administrative control over functions 
related to the performance of the judiciary.26 Although subsequent court decisions 
have clarifi ed or expanded these foundational concepts27 and McCormick has 
noted some additional preconditions of judicial independence in the Anglo-
American context,28 the Valente criteria remain fundamentally unchanged. 
and Ziegel to evaluate appointees from 1980–1984, we were not certain about how 
many responses we would need for each judge in order to feel confi dent about publishing 
individual results. 
25. Th e Globe and Mail article covering our project picked up on our debate about whether to 
publish individual results, but did not highlight our fi nal decision. Th is had the unfortunate 
result of implying that we were still considering publishing individual results. Makin, supra 
note 1.
26. Valente v Th e Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 673 at paras 27, 40, 47, 24 DLR (4th) 161.
27. Provincial Judges Assn (Manitoba) v Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 SCR 3 at paras 
118-24, 150 DLR (4th) 577.
28. See Peter J McCormick, “New Questions about an Old Concept: Th e Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Judicial Independence Decisions” (2004) 37:4 Can J Pol Sci 839. McCormick 
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Existing in “natural tension” with judicial independence is the desire to keep 
justices accountable.29 Th e questions of how judges should be held accountable, 
and to whom, have implications for JPE and are the subject of a range of perspectives. 
On the question of to whom judges should be accountable, possibilities range 
from the legal profession (particularly the judiciary itself ), to litigants, to the 
broader public and the public’s elected representatives.30 Possible mechanisms for 
judicial accountability can vary from indirect—such as norms regarding the 
judicial role and societal attitudes—to direct—such as appellate review, disciplinary 
hearings, administrative incentives and disincentives and, in the United States, 
retention elections. Where JPE is placed along these continua will depend on the 
types of questions asked, who conducts the JPE, how it is conducted, how widely 
the results are distributed, and what kinds of consequences, if any, will result 
from the evaluation. 
JPE projects initiated by the political branches of government—especially 
ones that include indicators of substantive decision making and have potential 
consequences for particular decisions—would pose the greatest threat to judicial 
independence. For example, proposals in the 1990s by some provincial Progressive 
Conservative Party backbenchers in Ontario would have imposed JPE measures 
on provincial court judges (including their sentencing practices in criminal cases), 
would have authorized evaluation of decisions in particular cases, and would have 
allowed a legislative standing committee to recommend to the attorney general 
a judge’s removal from offi  ce on the basis of a JPE report. Not surprisingly, these 
proposals failed in the face of concerns over judicial independence.31
Conversely, some arguments that JPE is unnecessary and undesirable appear 
to be based on an unduly limited notion of accountability. Th is notion suggests 
that review by appellate courts and disciplinary proceedings by the Canadian 
Judicial Council (CJC) are adequate—and indeed the only legitimate—channels 
for oversight of judges. However, it should be noted that the CJC’s oversight is 
noted two additional implied elements of judicial independence from the British tradition: 
judges are drawn from an aggressively independent legal profession and the use of formalism 
(ibid at 841-42). He goes on to discuss the “novel” elements that have subsequently been 
added by recent Canadian judicial decisions, such as the requirement of having a judicial 
salary commission (ibid at 847).
29. M L Friedland, A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Canada (Ottawa: 
Canada Communication Group, 1995) at 2.
30. Stephen B Burbank, “Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and Interbranch 
Relations” (2007) 95:4 Geo LJ 909 at 912.
31. See Derek Matisz, “Appointment of s.92 Judges in Canada” (MA major research paper, 
University of Guelph, 2005) [unpublished].
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narrowly focused on investigating complaints concerning serious accusations of 
judicial misbehaviour. Likewise, the capacity for appellate review to correct errors 
in the lower courts is quite limited. Not only are most cases never appealed, but 
many judges on the highest appellate courts see their primary role as jurisprudential 
development rather than error correction and are more likely to deny leave to 
appeal if the sole basis for appeal is to correct an error.32 Moreover, review by 
appellate courts is a much more limited form of evaluation than that envisioned 
by proponents of JPE. Appellate review and CJC oversight are not designed to 
assess, on an ongoing basis, a variety of important qualities such as a judge’s legal 
knowledge, demeanor towards parties and staff , communication skills, timeliness 
of decision making, and fairness. Mechanisms for feedback and accountability 
become even more important because of the long tenure that federally appointed 
judges enjoy.33
Th e Ontario backbenchers and those arguing against any form of JPE 
represent the extremes of the continuum. Indeed, most respondents in both 
rounds of our study and the participants in the pilot project in Nova Scotia in the 
mid-1990s were favourably disposed towards JPE in the context of professional 
development or as an academic study of the judiciary and did not view evaluation 
as a threat to judicial independence. Dale H. Poel reports that most of the Nova 
Scotia court judges who (voluntarily) participated in the JPE pilot project did not 
think that the evaluation process threatened judicial independence. He notes, 
however, that the project was carefully advertised as a method of promoting 
“judicial self-improvement” in order to avoid such concerns (and only the judge 
and a voluntary mentor saw the results). A vast majority (over ninety per cent) 
of the lawyers who took part in the Nova Scotia project, according to Poel, did 
not believe that the assessment infringed on judicial independence but instead 
favoured the periodic use of evaluation questionnaires.34
Th e lawyers who responded to our survey in Round Two were almost unani-
mously supportive of our approach to JPE, in which the aggregate results of the 
survey would be used in academic publications and the individual results would 
be given to judges upon request for professional development purposes but not 
otherwise disclosed outside the research team. Th e majority of respondents in 
32. See Brian A Crane & Henry S Brown, Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2000 (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1999) at 26; Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-Making in Canadian Courts of 
Appeal (Toronto: Lorimer, 1998) at 106-10.
33. Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M Singer, “A Performance Evaluation Program for the 
Federal Judiciary” (2008) 86:1 Denv UL Rev 7 at 22.
34. Dale H Poel, “What do lawyers think about judicial evaluation? Responses to the Nova 
Scotia Judicial Development Project” (2005) 10:2 Innov J: Pub Sec Innov J 10 at 8-9.
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Round One were supportive of JPE by lawyers and other stakeholders as well, 
though a signifi cant minority expressed concerns about judicial independence. 
Some respondents specifi cally stated that they would be in favour of JPE only if 
it were used for professional development.35
In both rounds, some respondents suggested that judges needed to be evaluated 
and that the results should be made known to their administrative superiors. 
Others went farther and argued that the individual results ought to be made 
public. Whether a wider distribution of the data, with possible consequences 
such as more training mandated by an administrative judge or general public 
displeasure, violates judicial independence depends on whether the JPE instrument 
is neutral in terms of judicial decision making. Th is issue, in turn, raises the 
question of what is considered neutral. A critical requirement of neutrality is that 
questions must only be asked about the process of judging (from legal knowledge 
to communication skills to fairness of treatment), not about the substance of 
decisions. Although it is possible that a particular respondent’s evaluation of a 
judge on matters such as fairness or the ability to apply the law to the facts may 
be coloured by a specifi c decision, or even by the judge’s general decision-making 
tendencies, surveying multiple respondents should dilute the eff ects of any 
consideration of substantive decision making on the survey results. Rebecca Love 
Kourlis and Jordan M. Singer argue that a system of JPE that focuses on process 
can actually enhance the ability of judges to make unpopular decisions because 
such decisions are placed in the larger context of whether the judge is considered 
to be a good listener, fair, knowledgeable, and free from bias.36
Some commentators, however, argue that even process-oriented questions 
can interfere with how judges ultimately perform their judicial function. Justice 
Gregory Geason, an Australian judge, argues against judicial evaluation on the 
ground that anything that constrains a judge beyond precedent or statute violates 
judicial independence.37 By way of example, he asks whether a judge who 
interrupted the parties frequently to identify key issues and reduce irrelevancies 
might suff er on an evaluation compared to a judge who placed more emphasis 
on letting the parties be heard. Th is is not a concern to be dismissed lightly, but 
it should be noted that Justice Geason acknowledges the general importance of 
35. As noted above, some of these responses may be attributable to the inclusion of questions 
about judicial decision making in the survey instrument (though they were not intended as 
part of the evaluation aspect of the survey) and from us not repeatedly emphasizing clearly 
enough that we only intended to publish aggregate results.
36. Kourlis & Singer, supra note 33 at 21.
37. Gregory Geason, “A fl awed proposal for judges,” Lawyers Weekly (19 October 2007) 20.
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judges acting with diligence, intelligence, and courtesy.38 Judges with diff erent 
styles could still score well on any indicator—a judge who interrupts parties, for 
example, could do so with appropriate respect. Moreover, the existence of multiple 
indicators means that a judge’s overall evaluation is not determined by any one 
characteristic. Also, surveying multiple respondents would help to reduce the 
possibility of systematic biases being introduced into the results, an outcome 
that could directly or indirectly infl uence judicial independence. In principle, 
we do not believe that a wider release of results from a process-oriented JPE 
would impinge upon job security, fi nancial security, or administrative control 
over functions related to the performance of the judiciary, the three key elements 
of judicial independence identifi ed earlier in Part II.
Would our conclusion be diff erent depending on who conducted the JPE? 
Stephen Colbran, for instance, argues that any JPE project conducted by the ex-
ecutive branch of government would violate judicial independence.39 Lord Taylor, 
the former British Lord Chief Justice, argues that any formal appraisal system 
for the judiciary would also threaten judges’ independence from one another.40 
Neither position necessarily off ers a compelling logic if the JPE is conducted 
appropriately (for example, by not evaluating the substantive outcomes of 
decisions). However, optics are important to the administration of justice—even 
the appearance of governmental interference with judicial independence needs 
to be avoided. As a result, if JPE is to be used for more than just professional 
development, where only the evaluated judges would see their own results, then 
it might not appear appropriate for a state actor (the executive or possibly even 
administrative judges) to administer the JPE system.41 A transparent JPE committee 
system with representation of various stakeholders, which may include the 
Offi  ce for Federal Judicial Aff airs, members of the judiciary, law societies, and the 
public, would be more compatible with the concept of judicial independence, at 
least in appearance. Th is arrangement would be similar to some JPE committees 
in the United States. It would also be analogous to existing structures in Canada 
that deal with such issues as fi nancial compensation and court administration. 
By allowing multiple perspectives into the process, such a committee structure 
would not only enhance the legitimacy of JPE but could also lead to tangibly 
better JPE processes. 
38. Ibid at 21.
39. Colbran, supra note 4 at 61.
40. Ibid at 57.
41. McCormick, supra note 28 at 847-49. Th is author notes that an emerging principle of 
judicial independence has been independence from administrative judges.
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Of course, if a JPE committee system were established, policies would have 
to be created to determine how results would be used. Reasonable people will 
disagree about what these policies should be. A middle-ground approach might 
be to release an annual public report containing the aggregate data (such as how 
many judges were ranked from poor to excellent on each indicator) and to provide 
the individual results to the judge and his or her administrative superiors. Th is 
approach could be coupled with the potential for some modest yet direct consequences, 
such as more training, based upon a judge’s results.
However, in the absence of a formal JPE system, we believe that it is appropriate 
and important for other actors, such as academics and the media, to conduct this 
kind of research on the judiciary. As we explained in our response to the CBA: 
Th e data may very well show that most of the judges evaluated are very highly regarded. 
If the data show otherwise or suggest that there is some room for improvement in 
certain aspects of the judicial role, then perhaps steps could be taken to address such 
issues and further strengthen the judiciary. We see our research as enhancing rather 
than threatening the rule of law (and the administration of justice). 
Given that many other countries in the world have introduced systems for JPE, 
what might explain the resistance to the concept in Canada? Th at question is 
explored in the following section.
III. EXPANSION OF JPE IN MANY PLACES, WHY NOT 
CANADA?
Our call for the introduction of JPE in Canada, at both the federal and provincial 
levels, needs to be placed in the context of the growing interest in evaluating 
courts and individual judges around the world. Reasons for this interest include 
frustration over a lack of timely access to justice; the growing policy importance 
of courts, particularly through their application of constitutional and legislative 
rights documents; and the rise of the “new public management,” which aims 
to make government bodies more effi  cient and responsive to “clients.”42 Th ese 
factors are at work in Canada as well, as evidenced by evaluations of court 
management in some provinces, such as Ontario’s Justice on Target project.43 So 
42. European Commission for the Effi  ciency of Justice (CEJEP), Monitoring and Evaluation of 
Court Systems: A Comparative Study (Council of Europe, 2008); Pim Albers, “Assessment of 
Court Quality: Hype or Not” (2009) 1:1 Hague J Rule of L 53.
43. Th e Justice on Target project publishes statistical information about criminal case processing 
times in Ontario courthouses as part of a larger eff ort to improve the effi  ciency and 
eff ectiveness of the criminal courts in Ontario. See Justice on Target, online: Ontario Ministry 
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what explains the resistance to the idea of evaluating individual judges, and even 
to a JPE study conducted by academics?
Part of the answer may lie in the broader socio-political context. In civil law 
countries where entry to and advancement in the judiciary somewhat parallels 
the process of the civil service, even if evaluations are conducted largely by judges, 
the concept of JPE may be less foreign. In the United States, institutional drivers 
not present in Canada, namely judicial elections, contribute to the acceptance 
of JPE. Th e political values that undergird retention elections (skepticism about 
government authority and support for institutional checks and balances) help to 
explain the relatively higher demand for judicial accountability and the use of 
JPE in the United States. The political culture in Canada, traditionally 
considered more deferential to authority than that in the United States,44 provides 
a less welcome context for JPE by emphasizing independence over accountability. 
The reluctance to adopt JPE in countries like Canada, Britain, and 
Australia, compared to its acceptance elsewhere, suggests that broader cultural 
and institutional forces, both legal and political, can help to explain the decision 
whether to adopt JPE. However, this is not a complete explanation. Pilot JPE 
programs in Canada and Australia, the evaluation of lower courts in the United 
Kingdom, and various British commissions’ calls for more systematic evaluation 
of judges all suggest that JPE is not completely foreign to the British parliamentary 
tradition.45 As we argued in Part II, there are ways of implementing JPE in a 
parliamentary system that would balance independence with accountability and 
professional development. Moreover, the diff erences in the timing and substance 
of JPEs within civil law systems and in the United States (some states do not have 
JPE, nor is there a JPE system for federal judges) indicate that more micro-level 
factors, such as group politics, are involved as well. In Canada, legal elites appear 
resistant to the concept of JPE. Th e major bodies representing lawyers and judges 
in Canada may not necessarily always be opposed to reform,46 but they do seem 
reluctant to embrace change, particularly if it is proposed by those outside the 
legal community.47 Th ese organizations see themselves as guardians of the legal 
of the Attorney General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/jot/default.asp>.
44. See e.g. Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: Th e Values and Institutions of the United 
States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990).
45. Colbran, supra note 4 at 56. Colbran notes that both the 1992 report by the Committee on 
the Judiciary (for England and Wales) and the 1993 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 
(Runciman Report) recommended having more formal appraisal systems for judges.
46. For example, see the CBA’s call for changes to the federal judicial appointment process. 
Canada, Canadian Bar Association, Federal Judicial Appointment Process, (Ottawa: 2005).
47. However, even changes from within the legal community can generate a negative reaction. 
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profession. As noted above, some of their members argued that our survey was 
ill-advised because it could produce negative fi ndings that, in turn, would 
undermine the administration of justice. While we gratefully acknowledge the 
help that a couple of law societies provided, our overall experience with this project 
seems congruent with some respondents’ sentiments that lawyers’ associations in 
Canada tend to be powerful and resistant to greater transparency.
Beyond specifi c objections to JPE, it is possible that respondents’ reactions 
are part of the Canadian legal establishment’s broader suspicion towards 
academic inquiry into the judicial system.48 Forty years ago, for example, Sidney 
Peck was criticized for studying the individual voting patterns of Supreme Court 
of Canada judges.49 More recently, in 2009, the Executive Legal Offi  cer of the 
Supreme Court of Canada issued a directive to all former law clerks of the 
Court not to participate in a survey sent to them by professor David Weiden—
a directive some clerks considered overly broad and counter to the goal of helping 
Canadians better understand how an important public institution operates.50 In 
2012, the chief justice of the Ontario Court of Justice sent a memo to judges 
asking that they not participate in a confi dential survey about criminal case 
processing times prepared by a Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University 
of Guelph. Th e Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario also refused to allow 
Crown lawyers and court administrators to participate in that study. 
Th is is not to say that there has never been cooperation from the legal 
establishment in an academic study of the judiciary. Appellate court judges, 
for instance, participated in surveys and interviews for Ian Greene’s frequently 
referenced book Final Appeal: Decision-making in Canada’s Courts of Appeal.51 
Additionally, Emmett Macfarlane’s book about the Supreme Court of Canada, 
Governing from the Bench, is based on interviews with current and former justices, 
former law clerks, and staff .52 However, these examples seem to be exceptions 
Provincial law societies unsuccessfully lobbied Canadian Lawyer magazine not to publish 
an article in its May 1989 edition that listed the best and worst judges in Canada. Th is 
evaluation was based primarily on surveys fi lled out by lawyers. Nora Underwood, “Rating 
the Judiciary: A magazine’s gradings cause controversy,” Maclean’s (22 May  1989) 56.
48. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for the idea to place our experiences into a 
broader context and for supplying the Peck and Weiden examples.
49. S R Peck, “Th e Supreme Court of Canada, 1958–1966: A Search for Policy through 
Scalogram Analysis” (1967) 45 Can Bar Rev 666.
50. Cristin Schmitz, “Supremely secret: top court wants law clerks muzzled,” Th e Lawyers Weekly 
(26 June 2009), online: <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca>.
51. Greene, supra note 32 at 212.
52. Emmett Macfarlane, Governing from the Bench: Th e Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial 
Role (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012). 
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rather than the norm. It would be interesting to address systematically how easy 
(or diffi  cult) it is for researchers to gain access to actors in the judicial system in 
Canada as compared to other countries.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our experiences have made us more acutely aware of the political dimensions 
surrounding JPE. We think that more research is needed to explain why JPE is or 
is not used in diff erent jurisdictions, either alone or as part of a larger system of 
court evaluation. What role do macro-level factors (such as culture, institutions, 
and the transmission of ideas between jurisdictions) as well as more micro-level 
factors (such as leadership and group politics) play in whether JPE is adopted 
and, if adopted, in what form? 
More research also needs to be conducted on the central question that motivated 
our foray into JPE in the fi rst place—what are the linkages between judicial 
selection systems and the quality of judges appointed? Somewhat surprisingly, 
this question has attracted relatively little attention. For instance, while JPE has 
been viewed in the United States as a potentially important tool in bolstering 
merit-based appointment systems, it has not been used to determine systematically 
whether such systems lead to the selection of higher-quality judges compared 
to systems of direct appointment or direct election. Indeed, although research 
has been conducted on such questions as whether judges appointed in diff erent 
systems decide cases diff erently,53 scant research has been done on whether certain 
systems of appointment actually produce better judges.54 Assessing the quality 
of judges appointed by the federal government under the screening committee 
system would provide a point of comparison for other selection systems, such as the 
nomination committee system used in Ontario, or even the systems of judicial 
elections found in the US states.
Our experiences have led us to think more carefully about conducting such 
research as academics. After two rounds adopting diff erent approaches to evaluation, 
we have been stymied by the objections of legal organizations in Canada. However, 
we still believe the project is important. A systematic examination of the quality of 
judges appointed under the current process provides valuable information on the 
process itself. Debates over judicial appointments should be informed by empirical 
53. Malia Reddick, “Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientifi c Literature” (2002) 106:4 
Dick L Rev 729.
54. For exceptions see Damon M Cann, “Beyond Accountability and Independence: Judicial 
Selection and State Court Performance” (2007) 90:5 Judicature 226; Brody, supra note 21. 
RIDDELL, HAUSEGGER & HENNIGAR, FEDERALLY APPOINTED JUDGES 425
data rather than anecdotes spun out in the media. We hope that our research may 
spur discussion within offi  cial circles and the informed public about JPE. 
Finally, we hope that, by highlighting our experiences, this commentary may 
lead to a dialogue within the legal community and between the legal establishment 
and academics about the potential value of scholarly study of the judiciary. We 
believe that carefully designed academic studies of the judiciary would give the 
general public, as well as legal and political elites, a better understanding of the 
judicial branch in Canada. Presently, perceptions of the judicial process in Canada 
may be unduly infl uenced by anecdotal media stories in the absence of more 
rigorous and systematic study. 
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APPENDIX: THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT
Evaluation
Please rank the judge on each of the following items for which you are familiar:




Knowledge of substantive law
Ability to apply law to facts of the 
case
Knowledge and application of the 
laws of evidence and procedure
Written decisions and orders are 
clearly communicated
Oral decisions and orders are clearly 
communicated
Treats parties equally and with 
respect regardless of gender, ethnic 
origin, religion, age, disability, 
sexual orientation or socioeconomic 
status
Demonstrates a basic sense of fair-
ness and justice, including careful 
consideration of all the arguments 
presented
Makes decisions without regard for 
the potential for public criticism
Issues opinions and orders in a 
timely fashion
Temperament and behaviour (at-
tentiveness, treatment of court staff , 
acts with dignity)
Eff ectiveness in formal settlement 
conferences
Eff ectiveness in pre-trial (or pre-
hearing) conferences (to clarify and 
narrow issues)
Court management (punctual, pre-
pared, docket management, control 
over proceedings)
What is your overall evaluation of 
this judge?
General Comments about the judge’s 
strengths and weaknesses (optional)
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Decision-making
[Note: this section of the survey was removed prior to the second round]
As part of our research we are also interested in obtaining your impression of the 
judge’s decision-making patterns, if any. Everything else being equal, how is this 
judge likely to decide?
Criminal Law More prone to support 
the accused (motions, 





Less prone to support 
the accused (motions, 
fi nding of guilt, sentencing 
recommendations and 
so on)
Personal Injury More prone to support 
plaintiff s (motions, 




Less sympathetic to 
plaintiff s (motions, 
decisions, assessment of 
damages)




Less prone to support 
the female
Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (legal rights—sections 
7-14)




Less prone to support 
the rights claimant
Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (fundamental 
freedoms, equality rights, 
language rights—sections 2, 15, 
and 16-23)




Less prone to support 
the rights claimant
General Comments about 
the judge’s decision-making. 
(Optional).
